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THE LIABILITY OF AN INFANT
STUDENT FOR FLIGHT INSTRUCTION
CYRIL HYDE CONDON*
Probably no line of endeavor, at least in modern times, has so
merited the title "Young Man's Game" as the aviation industry and
particularly does this seem true of aircraft operation, maintenance,
and repair. Despite its comparatively tender years American avia-
tion is now generally regarded as having outgrown the unfortunate
label of "infant industry." Nevertheless, to a great extent it still
depends, and no doubt will continue mainly to depend, for its skilled
personnel upon those who" at least during their novitiate, are classed
as "infants."
During the late war the military pilot above the age of twenty-
one was the exception rather than the rule and the records show
that the aerial fighting forces of all combatants listed many strip-
lings of seventeen, eighteen, and nineteen in ranks as high as Cap-
tain and Major. Today we have only to examine the Civil Air
Regulations to find concrete evidence that this Government still con-
siders youths several years short of attaining their majority as elig-
ible, so far as age is concerned, to undergo training as pilots and
mechanics, and to serve, upon the completion of their instruction,
as qualified practitioners in positions carrying a heavy burden of
responsibility for life and property.
Under the Regulations an applicant for a student pilot or solo
pilot rating may be as young as sixteen years of age, provided that
he submit with his application the written consent of his parent or
guardian. Private pilot, limited commercial pilot and commercial
pilot ratings call for a minimum of eighteen years, plus the written
* Of the firm of Wherry, Condon & Forsyth. Member American and New
York Bar Associations, Aeronautical Chamber of Commerce and Institute of
Aeronautical Scibnces. Counsel in the Adanowski case for the Curtiss-Wright
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consent of the parent or guardian if under the age of twenty-one.
The ratings of student glider pilot and private glider pilot are issued
to applicants as young as fourteen years of age, again provided that
the necessary written consent accompany the application, while the
aircraft mechanic rating calls for a minimum age of eighteen years.
In the light of these requirements, it is possibly no exaggeration
to assert that the several aviation schools scattered throughout the
United States maintain enrollments composed largely of students,
who, in the eyes of the law are "infants," and are deemed unable
to protect themselves in ordinary business transactions and relations.
As a general proposition the law presumes that such infant stu-
dents are legally incapable of contracting for the highly skilled in-
struction by which they propose to equip themselves to earn their
livelihood in their chosen field and are held liable for the reasonable
value of such instruction only if the Court be convinced that the
training is a necessary to the particular infant. If, for one reason
or another, and the factors influencing such decision appear to be
on the increase, it is determined that the instruction be not a neces-
sary, the infant not only is permitted to retain the intangible benefit
of his instruction, but may even recover from the school his entire
paid tuition, together with interest. The legal anomaly seems complete
and has wrought hardship to schools which in all good faith pro-
vided the instruction at no little cost and expense, as a decision
rendered several months ago by the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts serves to illustrate.'
Briefly, the facts of the Adamowski case were as follows: On
September 25, 1929, the plaintiff, a former resident of New Bed-
ford, Massachusetts, who had gone to New York early in that year,
voluntarily enrolled himself in the defendant's flying school located
in Valley Stream, Long Island, New York, as a student in the
Private Pilot's Course. The school offered various courses in flying
instruction designed to prepare its students for eligibility to take the
requisite examinations for the several classes of air pilots' licenses
prescribed by the United States Department of Commerce, Bureau
of Aeronautics. The school was one approved by and under the
general supervision of the Department of Commerce, and maintained
a large staff of licensed instructors, together with a fleet of licensed
training planes for use in student instruction. The courses of train-
ing followed the classifications which had been established by the
Air Commerce Regulations under the Air Commerce Act of 19-76,
as amended, the three chief types being Private Pilot's Course,
Limited Commercial Pilot's Course and Transport Pilot's Course.
1. Adamowskl v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Service, Inc., 15 N. E. (2d) 467
(1938); 1938 U. S. Av. R. 38.
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Prospective students were required to provide themselves with a
student pilot's permit which was issued by the Department of Com-
merce only upon proof of physical qualification. The instruction was
of two kinds; ground school designed to prepare the student for
the written examinations prescribed by the Department for the par-
ticular class of license sought and flight instruction, the latter con-
sisting of both dual and solo flying. The courses -could be taken
successively or in combination, dependent upon the student's choice.
Adamowski secured his Student Pilot's permit, paid the regular
$300 tuition for the Private Pilot's Course, took and completed the
training. At its conclusion he attempted the Department examination
for his Private Pilot's license but failed to qualify. Instead of at-
tempting a second examination he elected to enroll in the Limited
Commercial Course, build up his flying time and then seek his Lim-
ited Commercial license. He completed the Limited Commercial
Course, paying the requisite tuition of $1300 and at its conclusion
submitted himself to examination but again failed to satisfy the
Department of Commerce Inspector as to his flying ability.
On May 6, 1930, he enrolled himself in the Transport Pilot's
Course, but failed to complete the course, paid nothing on his tui-
tion and voluntarily withdrew from the school late in May, 1930,
returning to New Bedford.
It appears that the books of the school showed a small balance
due upon the Transport Pilot's Course at the time of the plaintiff's
withdrawal and after futile efforts to collect such balance the claim
was placed in the hands of an attorney in New Bedford. The
plaintiff denied the debt, asserting that he had been an infant at the
time of entering into the contracts for instruction and now having
attaindd his majority he elected to disaffirm. He evidenced his dis-
affirmance by instituting an action to recover the $1600 tuition, plus
interest at 6% from the respective dates of payment.
At the time of his enrollment in the Private Pilot's Course
Adamowski was twenty years and two months of age; was twenty
years and seven months of age when he enrolled in the Limited
Commercial Pilot's Course and was twenty years and ten months
of age when he registered for the third course. He was twenty-
two years of age, lacking nine days, when he disaffirmed his two
executed contracts.
At the trial he testified that he had enrolled himself in the
school "to learn a new trade and earn a good living." He also stated
that he had withdrawn from the school not because he was dissatis-
fied with the instruction or equipment, but solely because of ex-
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1-austion of funds. The undisputed testimony showed that upon his
two completed courses he had had a total of 23 hours and 53 minutes
of dual instruction and had actually flown solo for 40 hours and
20 minutes. Testimony showing that the fair and reasonable value
of the instruction given equalled the contract price was introduced.
All parties agreed that the law of New York governed.
The defendant rested its case upon three principal contentions,
namely (1) that the instruction rendered to Adamowski, being vo-
cational training in a trade, constituted a necessary to Adamowski
and he, therefore, was bound for the fair and reasonable value there-
of; (2) that Adamowski might not disaffirm his fully executed con-
tracts without restoring the consideration which he had received, or
accounting to the defendant therefor; and (3) that the plaintiff had
failed to disaffirm his executed contracts within a reasonable time
after attaining his majority and the failure so to disaffirm con-
stituted ratification.
The issues were tried before a Court without jury and resulted
in a decision against the defendant on all three contentions, judg-
meit being granted in favor of the plaintiff for $1600, plus an addi-
tional $563, which latter sum was composed chiefly of interest at
6%.
In his opinion 2 the Trial Court held that the vocational instruc-
tion rendered to Adamowski was not a necessary as a matter of law,
declining to follow the case of Curtis v. Roosevelt Aviation School,
Inc.,8 a New York decision holding that a course of study in an
aviation school to train a student as an aviation mechanic should
be classified as a necessary.The Appellate Division,4 while unanimously reversing on the
ground that as a matter of law the infant had failed to disaffirm his
executed contracts within a reasonable time after attaining majority,
also declined to follow Curtis v. Roosevelt Aviation School, Inc., in
the matter of necessaries on the ground that the opinion of Mr.
Justice Bogenshutz contained no citations supplementing his state-
ment that:
'It is my view that the course of study sought was to secure mechanical
kn6vledge to equip plaintiff for a job in that line and should be classified as
a necessary,"
and that apparently such language was to be construed as a finding
of fact rather than a ruling of law. Upon appeal by the plaintiff
to the Supreme Judicial Court, that tribunal reversed the Appellate
2. 1936 U. S. Av. R. 36.
3. (Mun. Ct. N. Y.), 1934 U. S. Av. R. 133.
4. Mass. Appellate Division Reports (1936) Vol. 1-No. 7 p. 569; 1937U. S. Av. R. 36.
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Division and inter alia affirmed the Trial Court's ruling that the
courses of instruction were not necessaries for the plaintiff.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine from this latter opin-
ion whether the Supreme Judicial Court was of the view that voca-
tional training in aviation is not to be included within the list of
infancy necessaries or whether upon the particular facts of the case
the instruction was not a necessary to Adamowski. The Court said
in part:
"In this country, as the judge found in substance, any stratification of
society is transient and shifting. Many a young man without capital or in-
fluential connections attains education and advancement in life through his
own labors. It would be hard to say that education in aviation was less
neces.sary for the plaintiff than it would have been for another more affluent.
But the law still guards the interests of minors against their own assumed
improvidence and want of sound judgment. The judge found that the courses
in instruction were not necessaries for the plaintiff. That finding was proper,
though possibly not required as matter of law."
Thus it would appear, at least so far as the State of New
York is concerned, that the question of vocational instruction in a
trade as a necessary is still undecided. The writer has been in-
formed that following the decision in Curtis v. Roosevelt Aviation
S'chool, Inc., members of the New York Bar interested in infancy
contracts, generally regarded that decision as reliable authority for
the proposition that vocational training in a trade, given to an infant
who is compelled to earn his living, and lacks a parent or guardian
willing and financially able to defray the cost of such instruction, is
a necessary as a matter of law, and it would seem that Professor
Williston is inclined to the same view.' The Adamowski decision,
however, seems to cast considerable doubt upon the reliability of the
Curtis case as a precedent in New York.
Where did the concept that vocational training is a necessary
originate?
We read in Coke on Littleton, 6 the following, written in the
quaint language of the day:
"And it is to be understood, that when it is said, that males or females
bee of full age, this shall bee intended of the age of twenty-one years; for
if before such age any deed or feoffement, grant, release, confirmation, ob-
ligation, or other writing, be made by any of them, Etc., or if any within
such age bee baylife or receiver to any man, Etc., all serve for nothing, and
may bee avoided. Also a man before the sayd age shall not bee sworne in
an enquest, Etc."
5. 1 Williston Contracts (Rev. Ed.) see. 241.
6. Co. Litt. 172 A.
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To this generality Coke carved out the following exception:
"Here by this Etc. is implied some exceptions out of this generality * * *
as an infant may bind himselfe to pay for his necessary meat, drinke, ap-
parell, necessary physicke, and such other necessaries, and likewise for his
good teaching or instruction, whereby he may profit himselfe afterwards; but
if he bind himselfe in an obligation or other writing with a penalty for the
payment of any of these, that obligation shall not bind him."
Hargrave in his note to the foregoing says:
"But Lord Coke's words imply that a single bond, that is one without a
penalty, being given for necessaries, may be good against an infant, and so
it hath been frequently adjudged."
It seems clear that Coke intended to include within the list of
common law necessaries what we today term vocational training in
a trade, and the English decisions interpreting his words have con-
strued the statement more liberally than American Courts. Typical
of the English decisions is Walter v. Evcrard.7 In that case an
action was brought by the master of an infant auctioneer apprentice,
upon a covenant in the apprenticeship deed, for payment of the bal-
ance of the premium which the apprentice had obligated himself to
pay. Involved in the case was the question of whether the par-
ticular training was a necessary. Lord Esher wrote:
"Then what are necessaries for an infant? Food and clothing always are
necessaries, if the infant cannot obtain them in any other way. Is education
a necessary for an infant? Looking at it independently of authority, I should
say that education in a trade with a view to making an infant a useful citi-
zen must always in this working country have been thought of the greatest
importance, and must always have been considered a necessary for an infant.
But on this point we have the authority of the passage in Coke upon Little-
ton, p. 172 (A), in which Lord Coke lays it down in effect that education
in a trade is a necessary for an infant, or rather I should say one of that
class of things which may be a necessary. What will make it a necessary?
If the infant can obtain the education which he requires in another way,
it may not be a necessary. You must have regard to the condition of the
infant in life-whether, for instance, he is a young man who will have to
earn his living by his own exertions. In the present case the infant was in
a condition of life which made it reasonable that he should earn his living
by means of the trades to learn which he was apprenticed."
Fry, L. J., interpreted Coke's language in an even broader sense,
thus:
"I think that 'teaching or instruction,' though it includes instruction in
a trade, is not necessarily confined to that. I should be sorry to conclude that
literary instruction likely to lead to the infant's success in a learned profes-
sion is not within the observations of Lord Coke; the interests of the State
7. (1891) 2 Q. B. 369.
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require that an infant should be able to bind himself for instruction of that
kind."
An interesting discussion on necessaries is also found in Roberts
v. Gray.8 It seems that an infant contracted to embark upon a ven-
ture as a billiard player, in company with one John Roberts, who,
apparently was a leading billiard professional of his day. The agree-
ment provided that the parties would undertake a world tour, Rob-
erts to pay all hotel and travelling expenses; that there should be an
equal division of all receipts and emoluments and that Roberts was
to defray initially the tour expenses, reimbursing himself from
Gray's share of the profits.
Subsequently, a dispute arose between the parties as to the type
of billiard hall to be used and the infant Gray repudiated the con-
tract. Roberts sued Gray for damages for breach of contract and
the latter counterclaimed for rescission. The infant claimed in
effect that although the contract might have been profitable to him
it was not one for necessaries and was voidable at his option since
executory in part. One of the questions involved was whether in-
struction in billiards constituted a necessary and the opinions of the
judges on that score indicate little doubt of their views.
Farwell, L. J., said:
"This is clearly a contract for necessaries within the meaning which that
phrase has had attached to it in the course of many centuries since Lord Coke
wrote. It is in effect for board, lodging, travelling and employment all found
at the plaintiff's expense for the infant and involved in the employment, and
the education which a billiard player of receptive capacity could not fail
to obtain from playing continually month after month with a great billiard
player like John Roberts. Every item which goes to make up necessaries in
the sense of a labour and education contract, except the express term to
give the education, which would be necessary if it were an apprenticeship
deed, is in this particular contract as much so as though, instead of finding
the board and lodging on board ship and in various hotels, Roberts had found
it in a house of his own where he gave exhibitions. I cannot doubt that this
is a contract for necessaries."
and Hamilton, L. J., wrote thus:
"The first question is whether this was a contract for necessaries, or, in
the words of Lord Coke,-Co. Litt. 172 A-whether it was a contract for
the infant's 'good teaching or instruction whereby he may profit himself
afterwards.' I think it is quite clear, as a matter of law, that this contract
as framed was capable of being, and was rightly held to be, such a contract
for necessaries. * * * Whether the contract is one for necessaries in this
sense must depend upon its substance and not upon its form, and there was
abundance of evidence here upon which it could be found by the learned
8. (1913) 1 K. B. 520.
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Lord Chief Justice, who was, by agreement, the tribunal of fact, so far as
the facts were involved, as well as of the law on this point, that a part and
most important part of this contract was the instruction that would be re-
ceived by the defendant from playing constantly with the plaintiff, and also
from playing under the conditions of a world-wide tour, a thing which a
distinguished billiard player apparently contemplates as part of his career."
Similarly, Cozens-Hardy, M. R., gave it as his opinion that
playing billiards in company with a noted player like Roberts must
be instruction of the most valuable kind to an infant who desired
to make playing billiards the occupation of his life.
A comparison between the Roberts and Adamowski cases is
interesting. Adamowski was a young man whose condition in life
rendered it necessary for him to earn his own livelihood. He had
worked since he was sixteen years of age and apparently was not
equipped in any skilled trade, as his previous employments indi-
cated. While in New Bedford he had worked as a plumber's helper,
car washer and a laborer, and while in New York as an upholsterer
and as a dishwasher while attending school. His stated purpose
and design in the flying school were "to learn a new trade," and to
follow commercial flying as his occupation.
In the Roberts case the infant Gray apparently intended to earn
his livelihood by playing billiards, and the Court seemed to have no
doubt but that his instruction on tour under a master of the art
would materially advance his ambition. Adamowski's flying in-
struction was provided by one of the oldest flying schools in the
country, operating with the Government's approval and under its
supervision, providing training by a licensed and highly skilled
corps of instructors and employing the latest flying equipment. But
the Trial and Appellate Courts seemed unable to find any benefit or
advantage whatsoever accruing to the infant from his instruction.
The Trial Court apparently was strongly influenced by the fact that
Adamowski had failed to pass his examinations and had been unable
to obtain work in any commercial flying service as a result of having
taken the courses, ruling, as a matter of law, that the quondam
infant was not chargeable "for the benefit, if any, received from
such instruction." The Appellate Division failed to mention specifi-
cally the question of benefit, while the Supreme Judicial Court in
its discussion, not of necessaries, but of the quondam infant's right
to disaffirm his executed contracts said:
"It is to be noticed that the contract was wholly executed, and that there
is no evidence that an earlier disaffirmance would have benefited the defendant
or saved it from harm. It is to be further noticed that the plaintiff has made
no use of his education in aviation, which has been of no apparent benefit
to him."
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Quite properly Courts give great weight to the advantages or
disadvantages to an infant of a particular contract, for in fact the
theory of an infant's incapacity to bind himself by contract is predi-
cated upon the view that infants must be shielded from the conse-
quences of their worldly inexperience and protected against the
follies and improvidence of youth. Adult imposition upon juvenile
inexperience has, unfortunately, been all too frequent, but, it does
seem a harsh rule to predicate an absence of benefit upon a student's
failure initially to pass his examinations and to secure employment
at the conclusion of his courses. If the school had guaranteed to
ensure him possession of his pilot's license and employment in the
industry, admittedly, the situation would be different. But, there
was no suggestion of any such inducement in the case under dis-
cussion. To the contrary, the plaintiff testified that he had with-
drawn from the school not because he was dissatisfied either with
the instruction or the equipment, but solely due to exhaustion of
funds. It is a matter of serious doubt whether any approved or
responsible flying school in the United States, either today or dur-
ing the past ten years, has held out to prospective students either
the guaranty of a successful examination or the assurance of future
employment.
From another point of view it is not easy to decide that Adam-
owski's courses were wholly without advantage to him. He en-
rolled in the school to learn to fly and learn to fly he did, for the
undisputed testimony proved that he had some forty hours of solo
time to his credit. Reasonable minds concededly may disagree on the
precise value of learning to fly, but it does seem difficult to conclude
that the knowledge which he had gained and demonstrated by his
ability to fly solo was of no benefit simply because his initial efforts
at examinations resulted in failure and that at the time of trial he
had apparently abandoned his ambitions in aviation. It would be
interesting to examine the statistics of the Departient of Commerce
and the Civil Aeronautics Authority with reference to the percent-
age of unsuccessful initial attempts at license examinations. Prophe-
cy is invariably hazardous, but it would be indeed surprising if the
figures did not reveal the percentage of first failures to be substan-
tially high.
If, as seems entirely possible, the Adamowski case will be cited
in future litigation for the proposition that a flying school must show
successful student examinations and subsequent employment as es-
sential elements to establish a binding obligation for instruction, the
results will be most unfortunate for, in effect, a flying school operat-
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ing in a State which provides neither judicial nor statutory pro-
tection will be held insurer not only of the student's proficiency, but
apparently even of economic conditions in the industry.
In marked contrast to the liberal interpretation of the English
Courts, American judges have construed the words of Coke in a
much narrower sense. The trend of American decisions has been
substantially to limit instruction or education as a necessary to the
three R's in the absence of strong factual circumstances demanding
the contrary, although there are a few decisions extending the doc-
trine to the trade schools.
In Pardey v. American Ship-Windlass Co.,' it was held that a
contract of apprenticeship to a pattern maker entered into by a
minor with the approval of his father, was binding and constituted
a contract for necessaries.
In Mauldin v. Southern Shorthand & Business University,"0
the Court indicated that a course in stenography would be a neces-
sary to a young lady of seventeen years if it appeared suitable to her
particular sphere in society or calling in life which her previous edu-
cation and attainments had prepared and fitted her to occupy or fill.
In Kilgore v. Rich,"' the term was extended to include a board
bill contracted by an infant to enable him to attend school.
On the other hand, in the oft cited case of Middlebury College
v. Chandler,12 it was held that a full course of collegiate study was
not a necessary, as tending more to be an adornment of personal
character and a source of private enjoyment rather than an actual
necessity. But, even in this case, the Court strictly limited its de-
cision thus:
"I would not be understood as making an allusion to professional studies,
or to the education and training which is requisite to the knowledge and
practice of mechanic arts. These partake of the nature of apprenticeships,
and stand on peculiar grounds of reason and policy. I speak only of the
regular and full course of collegiate study; for such was the course upon
which the defendant professedly entered."
In Turner v. Gaither,13 it was held that a professional education
is not a necessary, and in International Text Book Co. v. Doran,"4
a course in electricity was ruled to be in a similar category.
The New York Court of Appeals in International Text Book
Co. v. Connelly"5 decided that a five year correspondence course of
instruction in steam engineering was not a necessary as a matter of
9. 20 R. I. 147 (1897).
10. 126 Ga. 681 (1906).
11. 83 Me. 305 (1891).
12. 26 Vt. 683 (1844). See also Moakow v. Marshall, 271 Mass. 302 (1930).
13. 83 N. C. 357 (1880).
14. 80 Conn. 307 (1907).
15. 206 N. Y. 188 (1912).
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law in the absence of proof of the factual circumstances of the in-
fant, the Court holding that a common school education is doubtless
a necessary in this country, as essential to the transaction of business
and the adequate discharge of civil and political duties and that even
a classical or professional education might become a necessary as a
matter of fact under certain circumstances.
In Crandall v. Coyne Electrical School16 it was held that a con-
tract by an infant, who had neither parents nor guardian, for a
course of electrical instruction is not a contract for a necessary of
life either as a matter of law or fact in the absence of proof of
further circumstances of the infant's state and condition in life, or
what was suitable to his condition, estate and needs.
However, in Wallin v. Highland Park Co.17 it was conceded
that a course in pharmacy was a necessary and the infant was held
liable for the reasonable value of the instruction actually received.
It would therefore seem that, so far as vocational training is
concerned, the English Courts are more inclined to consider such
instruction within the list of necessaries and in effect to cast upon
the infant the burden of showing that by reason of his particular
circumstances the instruction was not essential to his well being,
either because he was well equipped in other fields to wage the
battle of life, or because he took the instruction merely for his own
pleasure and enjoyment.
For instance, in Hamilton v. Bennett 8 it was held that flying
lessons given to a law student while he was studying for his law
examinations was not a necessary. It is of interest to note that in
this case the Court apparently gave some consideration to the "dan-
gers of flying" and to the fact that the infant's parents were unaware
of his flight instruction.
On the other hand, with respect to training and instruction the
American Courts still indicate a marked reluctance to extend the
field of necessaries beyond the common school education. While in
a few instances vocational training in a trade school has been ruled
a necessary, the Courts have apparently hesitated to enlarge the
category of "trades" and are not easily persuaded that our highly
mechanized modern life, with its attendant severe economic compe-
tition, requires judicial expansion of instruction and training into
fields which in the past were regarded either as foolhardy or the
extravagance of a wealthy youth.
Instruction beyond the common school still seems presumptively
16. 256 I1. App. 322 (1930).
17. 127 Ia. 131 (1905).
18. 74 Sol. J. 122; 94 Just. Peace 136 (1930).
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unnecessary in the absence of convincing proof by the adult that
the training given was essential to the infant's economic welfare
and that he lacked a parent or guardian ready, able and willing to
supply such instruction. However, it will be noted, that the Su-
preme Judicial Court, perhaps because of the increasing prominence
into which, by reason of world conditions, aviation is being pushed,
voiced its doubt that the Trial Court should have ruled as a matter
of law that Adamowski's instruction was not a necessary. Certain
jurisdictions 19 have solved the troublesome problem of necessaries
by adopting, either through decision or by statute, the so-called
"Provident Rule," which binds an infant on his contracts for in-
struction or education if the contract was beneficial to the infant
and reasonable and provident when made.
While considerations of space do not admit of extended dis-
cussion on the second contention advanced by the defendant in the
Adamowski case, the Court's disposition of the question does pro-
vide food for thought to flying schools located and operating in
States which have not corrected, either by decision or statute, the
inequities inherent in the legal concept of infancy contracts.
Here we find a young man in the twenty-first year of his age,
who, between September and the following June, took and com-
pleted two courses, including ground school, and enjoyed a total
of some sixty-four hours of flight time under defendant's tutelage
and in its equipment. This instruction represented to the defendant
a substantial capital investment and one which, by the nature of the
activity, was fraught with financial hazard. Instructors were highly
paid and the cost of flying equipment, insurance, etc., was excessive,
one of the most serious items of the school expense being mainte-
nance and repair of training planes, which necessarily were sub-
jected to harsh treatment and, on occasion, even to complete destruc-
tion at the unskilled hands of student pilots. Not the least of the
cost lay in the upkeep of the flying field and the property taxes
thereon. While it might be argued, at least so far as a student's solo
time is concerned, that a proportionate part of the tuition shall be
considered rent or hire of flying equipment, 2 the fact remains that
what the infant primarily received was instruction and imparted
skill which in the nature of things being intangibles were incapable
of restoration upon disaffirmance. Nevertheless, he was permitted
to demand and to receive the return of his entire tuition with
interest.
19. In New Hampshire and Minnesota by decision: In California, Idaho.
Iowa, Kansas, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington. by statute, cf. Oklahoma and
Montana.
20. Boardwalk Cori). v. Ltttman, 164 Misc. 124. (1937) and authorities
cited therein to the effect that an infant Is liable for the fair and reasonable
value of the use and occupation of premises.
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What then of the oft-quoted rule of Kent ?21
"If an infant pays money on his contract and enjoys the benefit of it and
then avoids it when he comes of age he cannot recover back the considera-
tion paid. On the other hand, if he avoids an executed contract when he
comes of age on the ground of infancy, he must restore the consideration
which he had received. The privilege of infancy is to be used as a shield
and not as a sword. He cannot have the benefit of the contract on one side
without returning the equivalent on the other."
In New York the cases on restoration of consideration are, as
Judge Lummus points out, difficult of reconciliation. Upon analysis
it would seem that there are two main lines of decisions stemming
from Green v. Green2 2 on the one hand, and on the other from.the
later and more equitable decision of Rice v. Butler.23  Green v. Green
dealt with real property; Rice v. Butler with tangible personal prop-
erty, and it is interesting to note that the New York infancy decisions
relating to real estate have mainly followed the black letfer law
of Green v. Green, while those relating to personal property have
grouped themselves under Rice v. Butler.
In Green v. Green it was held that an infant who conveyed
real property to his father and dissipated the $400 consideration
which he had received, thereafter could disaffirm his conveyance
and regain the property after attaining majority, irrespective of his
inability to repay the purchase price. However, the close relation-
ship and the parties and the presumption arising therefrom was
clearly a factor in the decision, and the opinion of the Appellate
Division in Rice v. Butler24 directed 'attention to the fact that the
Court of Appeals in the Green case-
"was careful to state that it was not designed that the rule there adopted
should be extended beyond the particular facts of that case * * *"
Nevertheless, Green v. Green has been followed in subsequent New
York infancy cases involving real estate.2 5
In Rice v. Butler, where an infant, who purchased a bicycle on
the instalment plan, sought to disaffirm the contract of purchase and
recover the instalments which she had paid, the Court of Appeals
applied the principle of Kent and held that she must account to the
adult for the reasonable use of the bicycle or its deterioration in
21. Kent's Commentaries Vol. 2 (5th ed.) see. 239.
22. 69 N. Y. 563 (1877).
23. 160 N. Y. 578 (1899).
24. 25 A. D. 388 (1898).
25. Kane v. Kane, 13 A. D. 644 (1897) ; New York Building Loan Banking
Co. v. Fisher 23 A D. 863 (1897) ; cf. Wyatt v. Lortscher, 217 A. D. 224 (1926)q
also McCarthy v. Bowling Greent Storage and Van Co., 182 A. D. 18. (1918);,
contract of lunatic: also Casey v. Kastel, 237 N. Y. 305 (1924) to the effect that
the anpointment of an agent by an infant is voidable not void; quaere, Is the
Court's discussion of Green v. Green dictum in Casey v. Kastelf
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value, holding that in the absence of wanton injury to the property,
the value of the use would include deterioration in value. This
equitable rule has been followed repeatedly.2 6 Just why a distinction
should be drawn between real and personal property is not appar-
ent, unless it be due to the historical importance which the common
law has always attached to land.
Perhaps a further distinction between the two lines of judicial
thought may lie in this: that in the cases applying the equitable
rule of Rice v. Butler the infant had paid or committed himself to
pay money for property, either tangible (bicycle, piano, etc.) or, in-
tangible (labor performed, services rendered, or the use and enjoy-
ment of tangible property) and then sought to recover the money
so paid or to avoid his obligation to pay, after enjoying the benefits
of his executed contracts, while on the other hand, under the reason-
ing of Green v. Green, the infant had parted with property, had
received money which he had squandered or lost, and then sought
to recapture his former property.2 7 However, even in such latter
cases, if the quondam infant still retained part of the money or
consideration which he had received, he was obliged to restore it, but,
if his money had been dissipated, and experience teaches that money
does not cling to the fingers of an infant, he was not required to
do the impossible and was permitted to disaffirm with impunity.
True, the Courts have stated that the infant's legal right of
disaffirmance does not depend upon his ability to place the adult
in statu quo, but, should not the rule properly be limited to cases
where the infant lost, wasted, dissipated, squandered or parted with
the consideration which he had received and that in the cases where
he continues to retain all that he initially gained, even though it be an
intangible, his right of disaffirmance be denied.
In Wallin v. Highland Park Co.,2 the infant repudiated a con-
tract for instruction in pharmacy, but the Court held that he was
liable for the reasonable value of the instruction actually received
and permitted recovery only to the extent of the excess of his tuition
over the reasonable value. However, as heretofore pointed out,
in that case the course of instruction was conceded to be a necessary,
a factor undoubtedly influencing the decision.
26. Joseph v. Schatzkin. 259 N. Y. 241 (1932) ; Lown V. Sioon, 158 A. D.
900 (1913); Washington Street Garage v. Malloy, 230 A. D. 266 (1930);
Wantsch v. Wnertz, 79 Misc. 610 (1913) ; Sparandera v. Staten Island Garage,
117 Misc. 780 (1921) ; Egnaczyk v. Rowland, 148 Misc. 889 (1933) ; See also
Myers v. Hurley Motor Co., Inc., 273 U. S. 18 (1927).
27. But see Sternlieb v. Normandie National Securities Corp., 263 N. Y.
245 (1934) where an infant who had fraudulently represented himself to be
an adult in purchasing stock was permitted to disaffirm the contract of purchase
upon his unsuccessful speculation in the market and to recover the money paid
upon tender of the worthless stock.
28. 127 Iowa 131 (1905).
INFANT'S LIABILITY FOR FLIGHT INSTRUCTION
In Neilson v. International Text Book Co.,29 the minor was
permitted to disaffirm a contract for a course in electrical engineer-
ing and recover his tuition after return of the books of instruction
supplied to him, and in International Text Book Co. v. Connelly, the
text books were likewise returned by the quondam infant.
But, there were no books for Adamowski to return; what he
had received was knowledge and a developed ability to do that which
theretofore he could not do. He had not lost, wasted, squandered,
dissipated or parted with that which he had received from the de-
fendant; upon disaffirmance he still retained what he had gained.
Manifestly he was unable to divest himself of the intangible which
he had secured and continued to hold, but still he was deemed under
no obligation to account. This would seem to be an extension of
judicial solicitude for the presumed disability of youth beyond the
essential demands of modern jurisprudence and serves to focus
attention upon a condition which can best be remedied by prudent
legislation. The Courts themselves, although constrained to follow
precedent, clearly are not in sympathy with the conclusions they,
perforce, are compelled to draw"0 and have recognized that the
maturer youth of nineteen and twenty, in this day and age, is ap-
parently qualified to assume, in his commercial dealings with adults,
the same responsibilities and liabilities which the common law de-
creed he is capable of bearing on the dawn of his twenty-first birth-
day. In the absence of such legislation the Courts have even in-
voked the injunction, a weapon seldom employed against an infant.
For example, in Mutual Milk and Cream Co. v. Prigge," a nineteen
year old infant entered into a written agreement with his employer
not to solicit orders from the latter's customers within the three
years next succeeding his departure from such employment. Sub-
sequently, the infant severed his connection, entered the employ of
a rival milk dealer and thereupon embarked upon a campaign of
solicitation of business from his erstwhile employer's customers.
The plaintiff instituted an action to restrain the infant from solicit-
ing business from or delivering milk to the former's customers with-
in the three year period. The defendant pleaded infancy at the
time of entering the agreement. An injunction was granted, the
Court saying:
"This is not a question of the liability of an infant for damages for a
breach of contract. The question presented is whether an infant shall be
permitted to repudiate his contract without restoring what he has received
29. 106 Me. 104 (1909).
30. Joseph v. Schatzkin, 259 N. Y. 241; Sternlieb v. Norrnandie National
.Seeurities Corp., 263 N. Y. 245.
81. 112 A. D. 652 (1906).
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thereunder, and, if restoration cannot be made, without being enjoined from
making use of the knowledge he gained, to the disadvantage and damage, of
his employer.
The ordinary rule is, that although an infant may rescind an executed
contract at will, he must restore or offer to restore to the party with whom
he contracted what he received thereunder. (Rice v. Butler, 160 N. Y. 578;
Pierce v. Lee, 36 Misc. Rep. 870.) This principle is applicable to the case at
bar. Here he cannot surrender to the plaintiff the knowledge he acquired
while in its employ concerning its customers and his acquaintance with them,
which doubtless enables him to receive greater compensation, from a rival
dealer, and, therefore, as a substitute for restoration he should be enjoined
from making use of that information in violation of his agreement made at
the time when he desired and obtained employment and upon the faith of
which Re obtained the information and acquaintance. No case in point arising
within this jurisdiction is cited, but a modern English case is cited, showing
that this principle has been applied by the courts there. (Evans v. Ware,
L. R. (1892) 2 Ch. Div. 502; see, also, Fellows v. Wood, 59 L. T. Rep. 513.)"
The case, although dealing with an intangible is, of course,
distinguishable from the Massachusetts decision on the ground that
the conduct of Prigge constituted a continuing injury of an affirma-
tive nature, which demanded drastic action. Obviously, in the
Adamowski case, injunction (even assuming it would lie) provided
no remedy to the flying school, for it could demonstrate no injury
even if Adamowski continued to fly. But the very absence of a
remedy emphasizes the drastic need of reform.
In the Mutual Milk and Cream case the infant, grown adult, in
effect was estopped from violating the contractual obligations which
he had assumed while under legal disability, and his estoppel was
reinforced by the mandatory weapon of injunction. In principle,
therefore, should not a student who has completed full courses of
flying instruction, given in good faith, be similarly estopped from
demanding the return of his entire tuition? Otherwise, does not the
law border perilously upon condonation of inequity? Solicitude
for the infant's inexperience and protection against his improvidence
are greatly to be desired but surely not at the expense of innocent
adults, who, as in the case of flying schools, are by the very nature
of the particular activity compelled to draw their students from the
ranks of seventeen to twenty years. What should be protection be-
comes aggression and the ends of justice are poorly served. Until
curative legislation arrive or judicial thought change, the flying
school, when dealing with the infant, must seek financial safety in
an original undertaking from the parent or guardian.
